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Fiscal Balance Rule: Lookmg 
for an Economically Meaningful 
Way to Assess Fiscal Policy 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Notwithstanding its widespread use as a measure of fiscal policy, the govern- 
ment deficit is not a well-defined concept from the perspective of neoclassical 
macro economics. From the neoclassical perspective the deficit is an arbitrary 
accounting construct whose value depends on how the government chooses to 
label its receipts and payments. This paper demonstrates the arbitrary nature 
of government deficits. The argument that the deficit is not well defined is first 
framed in a simple certainty model with nondistortionary policies, and then in 
settings with uncertain policy, distortionary policy, and liquidity constraints. 
As an alternative to economically arbitrary deficits, the paper indicates that the 
“fiscal balance rule” is one norm for measuring whether current policy will 
place a larger or smaller burden on future generations than it does on current 
generations. The fiscal balance rule is based on the economy’s intertemporal 
budget constraint and appears to underlie actual attempts to run tight fiscal 
policy. It says take in net present value from each new young generation an 
amount equal to the flow of government consumption less interest on the dif- 
ference between (a) the value of the economy’s capital stock and (b) the present 
value difference between the future consumption and future labor earnings of 
existing older generations. While the rule is a mouthful, one can use existing 
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data to check whether it is being obeyed and, therefore, whether future genera- 
tions are likely to be treated better or worse than current generations. 
1.1  Introduction 
Recent years have  witnessed  a growing unease about  using  government 
deficits to measure fiscal policy. Martin Feldstein (1974) pointed out that vast 
amounts of unfunded Social Security retirement liabilities are not picked up in 
official debt figures. The 1982 Economic Report of  the President and Leonard 
(1986) stressed the same is true of unfunded civil service and military pensions 
and a range of  other programs such as FSLIC commitments, etc. Eisner and 
Pieper (1984,1985), Boskin (1987), and Boskin, Robinson, and Huber (1987) 
faulted the official U.S. deficit for ignoring government assets. These and a 
host  of  related  complaints about conventional deficit accounting coincided 
with demonstrations by  Kotlikoff (1979), Summers (1981), Chamley (1981), 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1  983), and others that (1) major intergenerationally 
redistributive fiscal policies can be conducted under the guise of a “balanced 
budget” and (2) identical fiscal policies can be conducted concomitant with 
dramatically different time paths of reported deficits. 
While some economists including Eisner and Pieper (1984, 1985) and Leo- 
nard (1986) suggest that the deficit can be fixed, the arbitrary nature of such 
corrections raises the question of  whether the deficit is a well-defined eco- 
nomic concept. Unfortunately, it is not. In a series of articles (Kotlikoff 1984, 
1986, 1988) I have pointed out that from a neoclassical perspective the deficit 
is an arbitrary accounting construct with no necessary relationship to the fun- 
damental stance of fiscal policy. The equations of neoclassical models do not 
uniquely define the size or sign of  government deficits, and “the deficit” in 
such models is purely a reflection of how the government chooses to label its 
receipts and payments. 
Since rational households and firms see through accounting labels, the pre- 
dictions of  neoclassical models are free of  fiscal illusion. Not only does the 
choice of  accounting labels have  no implications for actual fiscal policy in 
neoclassical models, but the reverse is also true: in neoclassical macro models 
the government can conduct any sustainable fiscal policy while simultaneously 
choosing its accounting so as to report any size surplus or deficit it desires. In 
neoclassical macro models fiscal policies have real effects, not because of their 
labels, but because they either (1) alter economic incentives, (2)  redistribute 
from different generations to the government, (3) redistribute within genera- 
tions,  or  (4) redistribute across generations. It  is  this  fourth policy,  inter- 
generational redistribution and its implications for saving and investment, that 
appears to underlie recent concern about loose U.S. fiscal policy. Intergenera- 
tional redistribution occurs whenever a government policy expands the con- 
sumption opportunities of one generation at the expense of another. 
This paper describes a new rule for assessing whether the government’s in- 11  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
tergenerational policy is in balance in the sense that future generations are not 
being made worse off as compared to current generations. The rule is denoted 
the “fiscal balance rule.” In contrast to the “balanced budget rule,” the fiscal 
balance rule is economically well defined. The fiscal balance rule is based on 
the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint and appears to underlie actual 
attempts to run tight fiscal policy. It says take in net present value from each 
new young generation an amount equal to the flow of government consumption 
less interest on the difference between (a) the value of the economy’s capital 
stock and (b) the present value difference between the future consumption and 
labor earnings of existing older generations. While the rule is a mouthful, one 
can use existing data to  check whether it is being obeyed and, therefore, 
whether future generations are likely to be treated better or worse than current 
generations. This paper proceeds in section 1.2 by demonstrating the arbitrary 
nature of “deficit” accounting with a simple two period life cycle model with 
no uncertainty. Section 1.3 shows that the economically arbitrary nature of 
“deficit” accounting arises equally in models in  which government policy is 
uncertain and distortionary and in which agents face liquidity constraints. Sec- 
tion 1.4 describes the fiscal balance rule and its use as a norm for considering 
whether fiscal policy is intergenerationally loose or tight. Section 1.5 discusses 
how this rule might be implemented empirically. Section 1.6 summarizes and 
concludes the paper. 
1.2  A Two Period Life Cycle Model 
A simple two period, one good life cycle model with zero population or 
productivity growth is convenient to show both the concern with loose fiscal 
policy that redistributes toward earlier generations and the fact that the govern- 
ment’s reported deficit bears no necessary relation to the stance of fiscal policy. 
At the beginning of each period a new generation of constant size is born, and 
members of  each generation live for two periods, their youth  and old age. 
When individuals are young they work full time, and when they are old they 
are retired. Each individual born at time t chooses how much to consume when 
young at time t, C,,,  and how much to consume when old at time t + 1, 
subject to the budget constraint given in equation (1): 
In equation (1) it+,,  is the interest rate at time t + 1. The equation states that 
the present value of  consumption expenditure (the price of  consumption is 
numCraired to 1) over the life cycle equals the present value of  lifetime re- 
sources which, in this model, is simply earnings when young, W,. The maximi- 
zation of utility given in (2)  subject to (1) gives the demands for consumption 
when young and old written in equation (3): 12  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
(3) 
At the beginning of any time period the young have no assets. Hence, the 
capital stock in the economy at time t + 1 corresponds to the asset holdings of 
the elderly at time t  + 1. The assets of  the elderly at time t  + 1 equal the 
savings they accumulated when they were young at time t. This savings per 
elderly equals W, -  Cyf,  which is simply saving out of first period labor earn- 
ings. This fact and (3) permit one to write capital per young worker at time 
t + 1,  K,+,,  as 
(4)  K,,,  = (1 - P>V. 
To  close the model assume that the economy’s single good is produced ac- 
cording to the production function in (5) that relates output per worker at time 
t, Y,,  to capital per worker, K,: 
(5)  I:  =  KP. 
Given the production function, profit maximization by representative firms im- 
plies the following expressions relating factor demands to factor returns: 
(6)  u:  = (1 - 01)Kp 
q  =  ciKP-l. 
Substitution of the first equation in (6) into (4) yields a nonlinear difference 
equation determining the time path of the economy’s capital stock: 
(7)  K,,,  = (1 - P)(1 - ci)KP. 
If  01  and P are less than one, this model has a locally stable, nonzero stationary 
state capital stock denoted by K,  where 
(8)  K  = [(l - p)(1 - ci)]”(’-a). 
1.2.1 
Consider now  an ongoing government policy commencing at time t  that 
takes an amount H  from each young person and gives an amount H to each 
contemporary old person. For young individuals born at time t their lifetime 
budget constraint is now 
Adding Loose Fiscal Policy to the Model 
(9)  C,,  +  CO,+]/(l  +  q,,)  =  - H  +  H/(1 +  q,,). 
Holding the time path of the wage rate, W,,  and the interest rate, r,, constant, 
this fiscal policy leaves generation t as well as all subsequent generations worse 
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old age to receive H  back. Hence, each generation from t onward loses, in 
present value, interest on the amount H.  The first generation of elderly alive at 
time t,  in contrast, benefits from this policy since they receive H but don't have 
to pay it back. Their second period budget constraint is now 
(10)  Cot =  (1 - P)V-,(l +  I;) +  H. 
With (9), rather than (I), holding, C,, = P[W, -  Hr,+,/(l + rr+,)],  and the 
capital stock at time t + 1  is given by  (11) since the saving of  the young at 
time t now equals W, -  H -  C,,. 
(1  1) 
The new capital stock transition equation is 
K,,,  =  (1 - Ply - HI1 - PI;+,U +  I;+,)]. 
(12)  K,,,  =  (1 - P)(1 - a)Kp-  H[l - PaK,*;,'/(l +  CXK~;I')]. 
The new stationary state capital stock, K', is found by setting K, = Kr-l = K' 
in (12).  Denoting by r the initial stationary state value of the interest rate, the 
derivative of the stationary state capital stock with respect to H evaluated at 
H = 0 is given by 
(13)  6K'/SH  = -[1 - pr/(l +  r)]/(l - CX)  <  0. 
Equation (1  3)  indicates that this intergenerational transfer policy crowds out 
the economy's long-run capital stock. Of  course, the crowding out process 
takes some time, and (12)  determines the transition path from K to K' associ- 
ated with an increase in H. 
The intuitive explanation for this crowding out of capital formation is that 
the redistribution to the initial elderly generation of  H at time t leads to an 
increase in their consumption by the amount H (see eq. [lo]),  while the young 
at time t reduce their consumption by  an amount PHr,+,/(l + r,+,),  which is 
less than H. Hence, aggregate consumption is larger at time t, and since output 
at time t is given, aggregate saving and investment at time t declines. This 
explains why the capital stock is smaller at time t + 1 as a consequence of the 
policy, but why does the economy end up in a stationary state with a perma- 
nently reduced capital stock? The answer is that although each successive gen- 
eration will consume less because of  this policy, their reduced consumption 
will, at any point in time, not yet have fully offset the initial increase in con- 
sumption of  the time t elderly; i.e., at any point in time there will always be 
generations yet to come whose consumption has yet to be reduced by the pol- 
icy. In addition, the reduction in capital at time t + l means a lower level of 
wages at time t + 1 (see eq. [6]),  which feeds back into lower savings by the 
young at time t + 1, and an even lower capital stock at time t + 2, with the 
process converging to the permanently lower capital stock of the new station- 
ary state. 14  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
1.2.2  Deficit Delusion and the Arbitrary Nature of Fiscal Labels 
In presenting this simple example of loose fiscal policy care was taken not 
to use any fiscal language to label the payment of H by each young generation 
to the government and the receipt of H from the government by each old gener- 
ation. It now remains to show that this policy can be conducted with the gov- 
ernment reporting a balanced budget, a debt, or a surplus. In each case the real 
effects of  the policy are identical, and the reported size of  the debt has no 
relationship whatsoever to the stance of fiscal policy. 
First, take the case that the government labels the receipt of  H  from the 
young each period as “taxes” and the payment to the old each period as “spend- 
ing on transfer payments.” In this case the government would report a balanced 
budget each period, since “taxes” equals “spending” each period, despite the 
fact that the government is running a loose fiscal policy. Furthermore, the bud- 
get would remain in balance the looser the fiscal policy, i.e., the larger is the 
value of H. 
Next let the government (1) label its payment of H to the elderly at time t as 
“spending on transfer payments,” (2) label its receipt of  H  from each young 
generation as “borrowing,” and (3) label its net payment of H to each elderly 
generation at time s for all s >  t as “repayment of principal plus interest in the 
amount of H(  1 + r,)” less a “tax in the amount of HrS.” While each generation 
of elderly starting at time t still receives H,  and each generation of young start- 
ing at t still pays H,  with this new labeling the government’s deficit at time t is 
H, and its stock of debt remains at H forever. To  see this note that at time t the 
government’s “spending” is H, and its reported “taxes” are zero. Hence, the 
time t deficit (“spending” less “taxes”) is H.  At time s, for s > t, the govern- 
ment’s “spending on transfer payments” is zero, but its “spending on interest 
payments” is Hrs. Since its “taxes” are also Hrs, its deficit (change in the debt) 
after time t is zero, and its debt remains permanently equal to H. 
As a third case, let the government (1) label its payment of H to the elderly 
at time t as “spending on transfer payments,” (2) label its net receipt of H from 
each young person at time t and thereafter as “receipt of taxes in the amount 
of  2H” less a “loan in the amount of H,” and (3)  label its net payment of H to 
each elderly person at time s for s > t as “spending on transfers payments in 
the amount of 2H + Hr,”  less “receipt of principal plus interest in the amount 
of  H(l + rJ’’ At  time t the government will now report a negative deficit 
(“taxes” less “spending”) of  -H.  And at time s >  t the government will report 
a balanced budget, since “taxes” of  2H plus “interest received” of  Hs  will 
equal “spending on transfer payments of  2H + Hr,.”  Hence, the government 
will report a positive stock of  assets, a surplus of  H  at time t, and, since its 
budget will be balance in each period after t, the government’s surplus (nega- 
tive debt) will remain at H. 
These three labeling cases show that a fundamentally loose fiscal policy can 15  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
be conducted with the government reporting zero debt, positive debt, or neg- 
ative debt. Furthermore, there is nothing to preclude the government from 
changing its labeling through time with the consequence that the same real 
policy could first be reported as generating a deficit, then be reported as gener- 
ating a surplus, and finally be reported as being conducted on a balanced bud- 
get basis. Finally, there is no requirement that the labeling produce either a 
zero debt, a debt of H,  or a surplus of H.  To see this, consider again the labeling 
leading to the reporting of a surplus. If the government labels its net receipt of 
H from the young as “taxes in the amount of 5H’  less “a loan of 4H’  and labels 
the net payment of H to the elderly at s >  t as “spending on transfer payments 
of 5H + 4Hg” less “receipt of principal plus interest in the amount of 4H( 1 + 
5):’  the reported surplus will be 4H rather than simply H.  Hence, the govern- 
ment can report any size surplus or debt while engaging in exactly the same 
economic policy. And individuals, since they care only about their budget con- 
straints, not the government’s choice of labels, will behave exactly the same 
regardless of the announced, as opposed to actual, stance of  fiscal policy. 
1.3  Demonstrating the Arbitrary Nature of Fiscal Labels When Fiscal 
Policy Is Uncertain, When Fiscal Policy Is Distortionary, and 
When There Are Liquidity Constraints 
1.3.1  Uncertain Fiscal Policy 
One possible objection to the above demonstration that fiscal labels are eco- 
nomically arbitrary is that it assumes that government policy is certain. Surely, 
the objection goes, “future ‘transfer payments’ and ‘taxes’ are less certain than 
the future payment of  interest on government bonds, which, in the absence of 
inflation, is very safe. Hence, this demonstration that rests on the equivalence 
of receipts and payments in a world of certainty does not go through in a world 
of  uncertainty.” Fortunately or unfortunately, this objection is not valid, and 
the risk properties of government payments and receipts do not provide a basis 
for fiscal labeling; i.e., the definition of “the deficit” is just as arbitrary in mod- 
els with uncertainty as it is in certainty models. The reason is that any uncertain 
payment (receipt) r? (where - refers to a variable that is uncertain) made by 
(received by) individuals to (from) the government in the future can be rela- 
beled as the combination of a certain payment (receipt) x  plus an uncertain 
payment (receipt)  -  x.  Since current payments (receipts) are certain and 
future payments (receipts) can be described as a combination of  certain and 
uncertain payments (receipts), the labeling of  the current and future certain 
payments and receipts remains economically arbitrary. 
To see more precisely why the “deficit” is no less arbitrary in uncertainty 
models consider again the two period life cycle model in which the government 
transfers from the young  and to the old. But now denote by n,  the amount 16  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
taken by  the government from the young and given to the old at time t. The 
young at time t know the value of HI (hence the - is dropped below for this 
variable) but are uncertain about the value of fi,+l.  To add to the realism of this 
example let us assume that output in the future is also uncertain due to a ran- 
dom productivity shock. The young now maximize expected utility given by 
In (15) F,+l and Tt+, are respectively the risky and safe rates of return at time 
t + 1. At time t, F,+l is uncertain. The term 8, is the proportion of the saving 
of the young at time t that is invested in the risky asset. 
Equations (16) and (17) are the respective first order conditions for the opti- 
mal choices of c,, and 8,: 
Insertion of (15) into (16) and (17) yields two equations in the period t choice 
variables Cyl  and 8,. 
To close the model assume that the production function at time t is given by 
(18)  =  .k,KP 
where A,  is uncertain at time t.  The wage at time t and the risky rate of return 
at time t + 1 are determined according to (19): 
Since the net supply of safe assets to the economy is zero, 8, will equal 1  in 
equilibrium, and (16) and (17) can be solved, given (19), for Cyl  and 7,. 
The economy’s capital stock evolves according to equation (20): 
(20)  K,,,  =  A,(1 - P)(1 - 4Kp  - HI - ?,,(~,), 
where C,, is chosen to satisfy (16). Note that the optimal choice of C,,, eYl,  can 
be written as a function of K,;  the function e,, incorporates information about 
the distributions  of A,+,  and  since these variables are integrated out in 
equation (16). 17  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
1.3.2 
As in the case of the certainty model, I have described the uncertainty model 
without labeling either H, or H,+I.  Suppose now that the amount HI  received by 
the government from the young at time t is labeled “taxes” and the payment of 
H,  to the elderly at time t is called “spending.” In this case the government will 
report a “balanced budget.” If it proceeds in this fashion the government will 
announce a “balanced budget” and a “zero stock of debt” forever. 
Next let the government (a) label its payment of H,  to the elderly at time t as 
“spending,” (b) label its receipt of  H, from the young  as “borrowing,” and 
(c) label its payment of H,+, as “a certain repayment of principal plus interest 
in the amount of  HA1  + 7,)”  less an  uncertain “tax” on the elderly at time 
t + 1 equal to H,(  1 +  F,) -  HI+,.  In words, the random second period payment 
is described as a combination of  a certain payment equal to “principal plus 
interest on H,”  plus an  uncertain “tax” equal to the difference between the 
certain amount H,(  1 + 7,)  and the random amount H,+,.  In this case the govern- 
ment will report a “deficit” of  H, at time t. At time t + 1 the “deficit” (the 
change in the debt) will equal zero assuming the government labels the fiI+l 
that it gets from the young at time t  + 1  as “borrowing” in the amount of 
H, plus “transfers” to the young at time equal to H, -  The sum of  time 
t + 1 “transfers” to the young, H, -  fir+,,  plus the government’s time t + 1 
“interest payments,” H,F,, equals the time t + 1 “taxes” on the old, H,(1 + 7,) 
-  and the time t + 1 deficit is zero. If the government proceeds in this 
manner through time it will report a stock of debt equal to H,  forever. 
If the government prefers to announce a debt of say 20H,  forever rather than 
a debt of only H,  it need only label its period t receipt from the young of HI  as 
“borrowing of  20H,” less a “transfer payment” to the young at time t of  19HI. 
If the government continues to label the payment of HI  to the old at time t as a 
“transfer payment” its deficit at time t and debt at the beginning of time t + 1 
will equal 20H,. At time t + 1 the government now labels its payment of fit+l 
to the old at time t as a certain “repayment of principal plus interest” of 204 
(1 + F,) plus a “tax” equal to 20H,(1 + 7,) -  H,+l.  If the government labels the 
fiI+l  it takes from the young at time t + 1 as “borrowing” of 20HI  less a “trans- 
fer” of  20H, -  fircl,  its reported deficit at time t  + 1 will equal zero; time 
t + 1 “transfers” of  20H, -  plus “interest payments” of 2OH,FI will equal 
time t + 1 “taxes” of 20HI(1 + F,) -  fir+,.  If the government proceeds in this 
fashion through time it will report a stock of debt equal to 20H1  forever. 
I leave it to the reader to convince himself that despite the uncertainty of 
government policy, the government can equally well label its receipts and pay- 
ments so as to report forever any size surplus it desires. 
1.3.3  Distortionary Fiscal Policy 
So far the discussion has ignored distortionary fiscal policies. The presence 
of distortionary policies does not alter the conclusion that the “deficit” is not 
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well defined. I demonstrate this point again using the simple life cycle model. 
In the context of the simple life cycle model with no uncertainty distortionary 
policy can be exhibited through the introduction of a wedge between the mar- 
ginal rate of substitution between consumption when young at time t, c,,,  and 
consumption when old at time t + 1, C,,,,,  and the marginal rate of transforma- 
tion between consumption at time t and consumption at time t + 1. Suppose 
this distortion is effected through a proportional “capital income tax.” In this 
case the lifetime budget constraint of generation t is given by 
In  (21)  T, stands for the rate of  “capital income taxation” and represents a 
distortionary policy since the marginal rate of substitution now equals 1/[1 + 
~-,+~(1  -  T,)]  while the marginal rate of  transformation equals  1/(1  + T!+~), 
where r,,, equals the marginal product of capital at time t + 1 (see eq. [6]). 
If  the receipts from “capital income taxation” are used each period to pay 
for government consumption and there are no other sources of  government 
receipts and no other government payments, the government will be reporting 
a “balanced budget.” Now suppose the government wishes to run the same real 
policy but report a “surplus.” One method it can use is to levy a nondistor- 
tionary “tax” on the young at time s 2  t of  say H,, lend this to the young at 
time s, and at time s + 1 use the return of  “principal plus interest” on this 
“loan” to finance a transfer payment to the old. This policy will leave each 
generation facing exactly the same lifetime budget constraint, including the 
same distortion with respect to current and future consumption, but permit the 
government to report a surplus of Hs at s 2  t. The new policy also leaves un- 
changed the net flow of payments from each generation to the government in 
each period; the only thing that has changed is the words used to describe 
the policy. 
The reader may prefer an example in which the government maintains its 
identical policy but uses distortionary “taxes” in “running its surplus.” Here’s 
one such example. Let the government announce at time t that it is eliminating 
the “capital income tax” from time t  + 1 onward but is imposing a “tax” at 
rate m,  on the purchase of  assets at time s 2  t. To  illustrate this policy let 
us write the lifetime budget constraint of  individuals born at time s 2  r  in 
two parts: 
(22) 
In  (22)  A,+I stands for the assets the young at time t accumulate and bring 
into period s + 1. If  ms  is set equal to T~+,T,/[~  + rs+l(l -  T,)] for s 2  t the 
lifetime budget constraints of each generation born at time t and thereafter will 
be unaffected by  the “new” policy and the distortion between consumption 
when young and consumption when old will remain unchanged. The only thing 19  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
that  will  change is the government’s reported  “debt.”  Rather than  report  a 
“debt” of zero, the government will now report a “surplus” of mA,+, at time t 
since “taxes” will exceed “spending” by this amount. At time t + 1 the govern- 
ment’s “spending” will be covered precisely by this time t “surplus” including 
interest earned by the government on this surplus; i.e., the value at time t + 1 
of the time t surplus is m,A,+l(  1 + r,+J  which, given the definition of m,, equals 
r,+,~~(w,  - C,,,), the “tax revenue” under the “capital income tax.” However, 
since the government will collect another m,,,  in “taxes” at time t + 1, its 
reported  “surplus”  (stock  of  government  assets)  at  time t +  1  will  equal 
mr+lAr+z.  At time s 2 t the government’s reported “surplus” will equal m,As+,. 
Note that in this example if the government lends its surplus each period to 
that period‘s young, the net payments from each generation to the government 
will again remain unchanged. Hence, to a Martian observer the only thing that 
will make this policy different from the previous policy is the government’s 
choice of words. 
If the government prefers to report a “debt” from time t onward it can do so 
with no change in policy by “borrowing” say 0,  for s 2  t and making transfer 
payments to the young at time s 2  t equal to 0,.  At time s 2  t + 1 it “taxes” 
the old an amount equal to Ds  plus interest and uses these receipts to finance 
its payment of “principal plus interest” on its borrowing of 0,  at time s.  This 
policy will leave the government reporting a “debt” of Ds  for s 2 t. 
Another way the government can do nothing real while reporting a “debt” is 
to announce a subsidy on the acquisition of assets for s 2  t. In terms of equa- 
tion (22)  ms is set equal to a negative number. If the government also announces 
an increase in the rate of capital income taxation for s  2  t + 1 equal to T; such 
that (1 + mJ[l  + rs+l(l -  T;~+,)]  = 1/[1  + ~~+~(l  -  T~)],  the intertemporal 
distortion will remain unchanged, but the government will announce a “debt” 
of msAr+,  for s  2  t.  While hardly exhaustive, these examples illustrate that the 
distortionaq nature of  the government’s policy does not restrict its ability to 
announce any size deficit or surplus while running the same underlying fiscal 
policy. 
1.3.4  Liquidity Constraints 
Another response to the above demonstration that “deficit” policies are not 
well defined is that the demonstrations ignore the possibility that at least some 
agents are liquidity constrained. If  some young agents can’t borrow against 
future income will they be indifferent between policy a, in which the govern- 
ment takes H from each young person and returns H to them when old, and 
policy b, in which the government “borrows” H per young person from those 
young who volunteer to make loans, repays these “loans” with interest when 
the leaders are old, and “taxes” each old person Hr, at time s? 
An affirmative answer is given in a very insightful article by Hayashi (1987) 
(see Yotsuzuka [ 19861 for an expanded treatment of Hayashi’s argument). Hay- 
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from the riskiness of an individual’s earnings. Hence, even though an individ- 
ual may not be able to borrow more than a specific sum against future earnings, 
he may still be able to borrow against future government payments. As an illus- 
tration of this point I present one of Hayashi’s examples although with different 
notation.  The example relies again on the  two period life cycle model, but 
incorporates the assumption that there are two types of young agents each pe- 
riod, denoted type A and type B.  Both the A and B agents earn W3  when young 
(assuming they are born at time 3). The A type agents earn AAW,+,  when old, 
while the B types earn A,WS+, when old, where A,  >  A,.  The problem for banks 
in lending money to the A  and B types is that the banks don’t know who is 
who. If they lend more than A,W,+,/(l  + r5+,),  where rs is the safe rate, to the 
A types, the A types will default on a part of the loan since their second period 
earnings are only A,W,+,. 
While Hayashi’s argument also goes through in the case of a pooling equilib- 
rium, I focus here on the separating equilibrium. I first examine the equilibrium 
with no government policy  and then introduce the government policy. If  one 
assumes a configuration  of  preferences  such that a separating rather than  a 
pooling equilibrium arises, the banks will separate the two types by offering a 
maximum loan, M (which exceeds AAWS+,/(  1 + rS+J),  such that (a) the A types 
are indifferent between borrowing this maximum and defaulting and borrow- 
ing and repaying a smaller amount, and (b) the B types borrow the maximum 
amount and repay. The indifference relationship for the A types is given by 
In (23) the left hand side gives the indirect utility of the A types if they borrow 
less than M and repay their loans. The term RAS  equals W, + AAWS+,/(  1 + rT+,), 
the present value of the lifetime resources of  the A types valued  at the safe 
interest rate. The right hand side gives the utility of the A types if they borrow 
the maximum M and then default when old. The term C stands for the subsis- 
tence level of consumption provided by society to people who have defaulted. 
Equation (23) is used to solve for M.  Given M the consumption of the B types 
when young will equal Ws  + M,  i.e., their first period wages plus the maximum 
they can borrow. Their second period consumption will equal A,W3+, -  M(  1 
+ rs+,).  The B  types  are, therefore,  liquidity constrained in  this  separating 
equilibrium; they would like to borrow more than M but cannot. 
The question posed  above amounts  to asking  whether type A  or type B 
agents will  change their consumption  when young  if  the government takes 
away H from each of them when young and returns H( 1 + r5+,)  to each of them 
when old. This policy leaves the left hand side of  (23) unchanged since the 
present value of  resources valued at the riskless rate r,+]  is unchanged. The 
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amount increases to M + H.  In this case the consumption when young of those 
borrowing from the bank equals W, -  H  plus the maximum loan M + H;  i.e., 
it equals W, + M,  the same amount that is consumed prior to this present value 
neutral government policy. The banks are willing to increase their loan amount 
to the type B agents because they understand that the A types will, on net, be 
no better off if they select into the group borrowing the now larger maximum 
because they will need the larger maximum just to remain indifferent between 
borrowing the maximum and borrowing less than the maximum. Hence, at the 
margin  the  type  B  agents  are  not  liquidity  constrained  with  respect  to 
government-determined changes in the timing of  their income flows, and the 
“liquidity constrained” B type agents will consume the same when young de- 
spite the government’s taking H  from them when young. 
Perhaps the easiest way  to understand the argument is to note that in each 
of the above examples of relabeling the same policy, the cash flows between 
the young and old households and the government at each point in time are the 
same. Since these cash flows determine the degree of liquidity constraint, fiscal 
policy can be arbitrarily relabeled with no impact on liquidity constraints. For 
the United States there is conflicting evidence on whether even a minority of 
households are liquidity constrained (e.g., Hayashi [  19871 and Altonji and 
Siow [1987]). But  even if  the great majority  of  households were  so con- 
strained, the argument would be valid. 
1.4  Can We  Discuss Fiscal Policy without Using the Words 
“Taxes,” “Spending,” and “Deficits”? 
After some reflection on the labeling illustrations of the previous sections, 
one might offer the following defense of the use of the terms “taxes,” “spend- 
ing,’’ and “deficits”: “Well, I agree that the quantities we measure as ‘taxes,’ 
‘spending,’ and ‘deficits’ are not meaningful measures of fiscal policy in and 
of  themselves, but the important thing is not what the government labels its 
receipts and payments, rather the important thing is thinking comprehensively 
about the government’s receipts and payments. As long as I keep track of all of 
the government’s lump sum and distortionary receipts and payments extracted 
from and made to particular individuals, I can use any words I want to describe 
particular receipts and payments.” True! But thinking comprehensively about 
the distortionary and nondistortionary net payments extracted from particular 
individuals is equivalent to specifying their lifetime budget constraints. Once 
one realizes this point, there is no reason to use potentially misleading lan- 
guage when one can describe precisely how government policy affects individ- 
uals’ lifetime budget constraints. Indeed, the policy description in section 1.2 
is an example of how one can discuss fiscal policy without ever using the words 
“taxes,” “spending,” and “deficits” and without classifying assets as “private” 
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This section offers some new terminology, centered around lifetime budget 
constraints, to describe fiscal policies. The section first discusses nondistor- 
tionary policies and then considers distortionary policies. The new fiscal vo- 
cabulary succinctly summarizes the government’s fundamental policy instru- 
ments. One can think about policy in terms of changes in these instruments. In 
addition to describing these instruments, this section discusses the choice of 
these instruments through time. In this regard this section examines a rule to 
which the government must ultimately adhere (if the economy reaches a steady 
state) in setting policy through time so as to obey the economy’s intertemporal 
budget constraint. This rule, which  I denote the fiscal balance rule, has no 
relationship to conventional “budget balance”; i.e., the government can obey 
“budget balance” while violating the fiscal balance rule. 
1.4.1  Describing Nondistortionary Policy 
If  policy is not distortionary and there is no uncertainty, the government’s 
treatment of each individual over his lifetime can be fully summarized by the 
present value of the individual’s lifetime net payment (LNP) to the government. 
The LNP (the generational account) is a sufficient statistic for the government’s 
treatment of individuals; any intertemporal equilibrium will be unaffected by 
changes in the timing of lifetime net payments to the government that leave 
individual LNPs unchanged. Equation (24) shows how the LNP (denoted N,) 
enters the lifetime budget constraint of individuals born at time t in the simple 
two period OLG mode1.I 
Let us now consider a stationary state of a two period Cobb-Douglas econ- 
omy in which government consumption equals G and N, = N.  In the stationary 
state income equals consumption; hence, the capital stock is defined by 
(25)  k“  = [p + (1 - p)(1 +  r)](W - N)  +  G 
where r = ak-’  and W = (1 -  a)k.  In (25)  p(  W -  N) is the consumption of 
the young and (1 -  p)(  1 + r)(  W -  N)  is the consumption of the old. There is 
no need for N to equal G. Different combinations of N  and G are consistent 
with different stationary states. In the stationary state N may be negative, and 
G may be zero or positive. Larger values of G and smaller values of N will be 
associated with larger values of stationary state capital. This may seem surpris- 
ing. How can larger values of government consumption and a smaller LPN be 
consistent with more long-run capital accumulation? The answer is that equa- 
tion (25) only tells us about the stationary state; it says nothing about the transi- 
tion leading up to the stationary state. To see how the transition matters, start 
in a stationary state with a given N and G and consider a policy in which the 
government permanently raises G. According to (25)  there is a new stationary 
1. Note that in the policy of  section 1.2 N, = -H  + H/(  1 + r,+,) 23  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
state with the original N, but larger values of  G and k that is feasible. But 
will the economy ever get there? The economy can get there, but only if the 
government raises the LNPs on some generations during the transition. In other 
words, a new stationary state with a higher G, a higher k, and the same N is 
only feasible if the government makes generations alive in the transition to the 
new stationary state pay the bill. 
Starting at time t from an initial stationary state what is the transition equa- 
tion determining the evolution of the economy’s capital stock? Equations (26) 
and (27) answer this question. 
(26)  k,,,  =  k, +  ky - P(y - N,) - Cot - G, 
ks+l  =  k, +  k,* - P(Y - Ns) 
(27) 
- (1 - P)(1 +  c)(Y-,  - Ns-,) - G,  sa. 
Equation (26) states that capital at time t + 1 equals income at time t less .  31 
private plus government consumption at time r. The consumption of the young 
at time r, P(W, -  N,) incorporates the new (if N, # N)  choice of an LNP for 
the generation born at time t. The term C,,  is the consumption of  the old at 
time r. If the policy does not involve any change in consumption of the initial 
elderly, Co,  will equal (1 -  P)(1 + r)(W -  N),  otherwise it will equal this 
amount less an additional net payment  extracted from the elderly. Equation 
(26) holds for periods after time r. At time s 2 r consumption of the elderly 
can be written as (1 -  @)(1  + rs)(Ws_l  -  Ns-l). 
To summarize, the government’s choice of policy can be fully described as 
(a) a decision whether to extract an additional net payment  from the initial 
elderly, (b) the choice of a time path of LNPs (the time path of N, for s 2 r), 
and (c) the choice of a time path of  government consumption (G, for s 2  r). 
The government  need  only announce these elements of its policy  and need 
never use the ill-defined words “taxes,” “spending,” and “deficits.” 
1.4.2  The Fiscal Balance Rule 
The next question that this new vocabulary raises is, If the government aban- 
dons the rule of “balancing the budget,” what rule should it use to guide it in 
choosing the time paths of the N, and the G,; i.e., what rule can the government 
use to make sure it is obeying the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint? 
To consider this question let us first look at the economy’s intertemporal budget. 
Equation (25) turns out to be simply the flow version of the stationary econo- 
my’s intertemporal budget constraint. Since k” = rk + W,  equation (25) can be 
rewritten in the standard form for the intertemporal budget constraint, viz.: 
W(l +  r) 
r 
k(l +  r)  + 
(25‘) 
G(l +  r)  r, + (I - P)(I +  r)(W - N)  + 
r  r 
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or, after subtracting W(  1 + r)/r  from both sides: 
N(l +  r) -  G(l +  r) 
r  r 
(25”)  k(1 +  r) - (1 - p)(1 +  r)(W - N)  +  - 
Equation (25’) states that the present value of  the economy’s resources (the 
sum of its nonhuman and human wealth) equals the present value of the con- 
sumption of young and future generations (the first term on the right hand side 
of the equation) plus the consumption of the current old plus the present value 
of  government consumption. Equation (25”)  states that the present value of 
what the government consumes must be financed by  the difference between 
the economy’s nonhuman wealth and the consumption of the current old plus 
the present value of  the LNPs from future generations. Intuitively equation 
(25”) says that the government’s resources for financing the present value of its 
consumption are the economy’s capital left over after the elderly have con- 
sumed plus the amount that will be taken from young and future generations. 
Equation (25”)  also represents the stationary state rule for setting fiscal pol- 
icy. Let the stationary state level of government consumption be G. Then in the 
stationary state N, must be set each period to satisfy 
(25”’) 
The rule says: set the net lifetime payment of each successive generation equal 
to the flow of government consumption less the interest on the economy’s capi- 
tal stock left over after the current elderly consume. A more intuitive statement 
of the fiscal balance rule is: “extract enough from each successive generation 
such that if you were in the stationary state you would stay there and not im- 
pose a larger or smaller burden (NLP) on subsequent generations.” 
In a more realistic model where each period refers to a single year and in 
which adulthood begins at say age 20, the fiscal balance rule would be to set 
the net lifetime payment of each new cohort of 20-year-olds equal to annual 
government consumption less the product of the interest rate times the sum of 
the economy’s current (in the year the cohort hits age 20) capital stock and 
human wealth (the present value of labor earnings of  existing adults) less the 
present value of consumption of existing adults. If there is population or pro- 
ductivity growth the rule needs to be adjusted slightly; in the case of  the two 
period model the rule with growth is given by N, = G -  [(rs  -  n)/(  1 + r,)][K(  1 
+ r,) -  C,,], where 1 + n stands for the product of one plus the rate of popula- 
tion growth and one plus the rate of productivity growth. 
Now  consider a policy transition starting at time t from a stationary state 
that  involves keeping G constant at  but  altering the time path of  N, for 
s 2  t. While the time path of N, can be chosen arbitrarily for a period of time, 
if  the economy is to converge to a stationary state the government must ulti- 
mately choose a rule for setting N, that leads to stationary state convergence. 25  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
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Note: a = 0.5, p = 0.3, and X = 0.2. 
Any policy rule can be described as a function N, = R(G,  k,, C,,-,), since the 
three arguments of this function fully circumscribe the government’s choice of 
N,; i.e., the government needs to finance a constant time path of G, it needs to 
honor (if it is time consistent) the consumption of  the elderly, COs-,,  and it 
needs to think about the resource base of the current and future economy which 
is fully described by k,. Since the rule N, = N(G,  k,, COs-,),  where the function 
N( ,  ,  ) is given by the right hand side of (25”’),  must be satisfied in the station- 
ary state, any policy rule R(G,  k,, C,,-,) which leads the economy to converge 
to a stationary state must, itself, converge to N(G,  k,,  C,,-,).  I denote the rule 
N, = N(G,  ks, C,,-,)  the underlying “fiscal balance rule.” 
While there is no guarantee that any particular rule R(G,  k,,  COs-,)  will lead 
the economy to converge to a stationary state, the simulations of Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987) in their 55 period life cycle model used the “fiscal policy 
rule” itself (i.e., they set R(G,  k,, Cos-,)  = N(G,  k,, C,,-,))  and found no prob- 
lems with convergence to a unique stationary state for a range of  reasonable 
parameter values (see Laitner  [1988] for an  analysis of  uniqueness in  the 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff model). 
Table 1.1 gives an example of  a loose fiscal policy using the simple two 
period model and the fiscal balance rule. The economy, whose parameters are 
given in the table, is initially at a stationary state with values of  k = 0.138, 
G = 0.1104, and N = 0.1104. The new policy involves reducing by  10 percent 26  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
the NLP of  the generation  born at time t. At time s > t the value of N, (the 
NLP of  generation  s) is set by the fiscal balance rule. Note that this policy 
raises the consumption of generation s,  but lowers that of subsequent genera- 
tions. Associated  with  this  intergenerational  redistribution  is  a 30  percent 
crowding out of capital. 
Before turning to the issue of distortionary policy, it is useful  to consider 
the nonrelationship between the fiscal balance rule and conventional  “budget 
balance.” An easy illustration of the point that “budget balance” does not nec- 
essarily imply fiscal balance is given by the case of a “pay as you go” social 
security  system. Suppose the economy is initially  (at time t)  in a stationary 
state with no government policy whatsoever (N = 0 and G = 0). At time t the 
government announces that starting at time t it will “tax” each young genera- 
tion s  for s  2  t an amount Xs  and “transfer” the proceeds to the contemporane- 
ous old. Since at each point in time “taxes” equals “spending,” this policy satis- 
fies ’budget  balance” forever. For the old at time t the new policy means an 
increase of X,  in their consumption. For generation s, where s > t, the policy 
involves setting N, = -Xs + X5+,/(1  + rs+,).  Suppose the government chooses 
its initial X,  and then sets X5+, = (1 + r3+,)XS  thereafter for s > t. In this case 
N, = 0 for all s 2 t, and this “balanced budget” policy never obeys the fiscal 
balance rule and, since it violates the economy’s intertemporal budget con- 
straint, leads the capital stock to implode. 
If the fiscal balance rule rather than the “balanced budget” rule were obeyed 
starting at t  + 1, the government would set N, = -[1-,/(1  + rs)]X,  for s 2 t, 
leading the economy to converge to a stationary state with a lower, but positive 
capital stock. Depending on the policy’s labeling, obeying the fiscal policy rule 
in this case might be described as “keeping the level of old age benefits (trans- 
fers) constant and adjusting taxes to meet the fixed level of benefits plus pay 
for government consumption” or it might be described as “keeping debt per 
young worker constant.”2 Again, announcement of “social security trust fund 
balance” or “federal budget balance” may be associated with policies obeying 
fiscal balance, but they also may not. 
2. If the amount X, taken from the young at time t is labeled “borrowing,” the amount given to 
the old at time t is labeled a “transfer payment” and subsequent receipts from each new young 
generation are taken when young and labeled “taxes,” then for s >  t the quantity -  [Ks(  1 + r,) - 
C,,]  in the fiscal balance rule will correspond to “debt per young person,” and the fiscal balance 
rule would read “tax each new generation an amount N,  equal to government consumption plus 
interest on government debt: i.e., keep debt per young person constant.” If  the amount X, taken 
from the young at time t is labeled “taxes,” rather then borrowing, the amount given to the old at 
time t is labeled a “transfer payment,” and receipts taken from generation s > t when young are 
labeled “taxes” and payments made to generation s > t when old are labeled “transfers” and there 
is no “debt,” then the amount  -[K,(l  + r,) - C,,]  in the fiscal balance rule will correspond to 
“transfers to the elderly” and the fiscal balance would be read “set taxes high enough to cover 
government consumption and keep transfers to the elderly at the current level of  -[Kr(l  + rJ - 
CJ;  i.e., keep transfers to the elderly constant through time.” In addition to paying “taxes” to 
cover G at time s, the young at time s pay “taxes” sufficient to cover “transfers” to the elderly at 
time s,  -[K,(1  + r,) - C,,]:  but when they are old the generation born at time s will receive 27  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
1.4.3  Describing Distortionary Policy 
As in the case of nondistortionary policy, fiscal policy can be characterized 
with reference to individual lifetime budget constraints. Take, as an example, 
the case of a distortionary capital income tax. In this case the lifetime budget 
constraint equation (24) still holds, but the lifetime net payment, N,, now in- 
cludes the net present value of distortionary payments to the government plus 
the present value of  nondistortionary  payment^.^ With this budget constraint 
the share of net lifetime resources (valued at the pretax interest rate) spent on 
consumption when young, p, depends on the interest rate and the rate of capital 
income taxation. Hence, equation (28), defining stationary state capital, ex- 
presses p as a function of r and T~.  In (28) N should be understood to include 
the net present value of lifetime distortionary payments to the government. 
(28) 
The transition equations are 
(29)  k,+, =  k, +  kp - P(T+19Tk,tlj(Y  - N,) - C,, - G, 
(30) 
k“  =  [P(~,T~)  + (1 - P(T-,T~))(~  +  r)](W - N)  +  G. 
k+l =  4 +  k,“ - P(T+I9Tk,+l)(W - Ns) 
- (1 - P(T~~~T~,+~))(~  +  <)(W,-, - Ns-l)  - G,. 
The form of the fiscal balance rule is not changed. However, in determining N, 
in (25”‘) the government needs to consider the net present value of its receipts 
from each new generation arising from its distortionary as well as nondistor- 
tionary policies; i.e., in setting its capital income tax rates the government must 
consider how this policy will influence its time path of N,. 
1.5  Can We  Implement the Fiscal Balance Rule Empirically? 
The fiscal balance rule represents a means (but not a unique means) for 
judging the stance of current policy. The use of this rule does not require de- 
scribing how policy changes will affect the economy. Hence, the use of this 
rule does not require a fully articulated model that would determine, for ex- 
ample, how factor prices respond to changes in policy. Use of the fiscal balance 
rule does, however, require one to specify what one believes current policy to 
be. This, in turn, requires specifying current future policy, i.e., the time path of 
“transfers” of  -[K,(I  + r,) - C,,];  hence the present  value of  their lifetime payment, N,, is 
G + [Kx(  1 + rJ -  C,,]  -  [KJl  + rJ -  C,,]/(I  + rStl).  which is the fiscal balance rule except for 
the difference between r3  and rr+l. 
3. One can always express a budget constraint with distorted prices as a budget constraint with 
nondistorted prices, but with the present value of lifetime resources now reduced by  an amount 
equal to the present value of  distortionary payments to the government. Thus eq. (21) can be 
written as C, + Co,+J(1  + r,+,) = W -  N,  where N = r,+l  T~C~,+J(I  + r,+,). 28  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
policy in the future currently expected to prevail. For example, in forming the 
value for Ns in (25“‘)  based on an economy with a social security system one 
would need to consider what generation s will pay  to the government  when 
young and what it will receive when old. It is this receipt when old that consti- 
tutes an aspect of current future policy. 
In addition to specifying current future policy, determining whether the gov- 
ernment is obeying the fiscal balance rule requires projecting  future factor 
prices. The prevailing term structure of interest rates can be used to value fu- 
ture earnings and consumption streams, but the levels of future earnings will 
have to be projected.  Projecting future earnings of those currently alive re- 
quires specifying the growth rates of population and productivity, It remains 
to be seen how  sensitive will be the evaluation of  the fiscal balance rule to 
these assumptions. 
Another issue that needs to be examined is how to deal with life span uncer- 
tainty in forming the present value of the future earnings and consumption of 
existing adult generations. Treatment of this kind of uncertainty as well as the 
uncertainty of future earnings and government policy need to be considered 
prior to actually implementing the fiscal balance rule. Still, even at this stage 
the empirical implementation of the fiscal balance rule seems eminently fea- 
sible. 
An advantage of the fiscal balance rule is that its implementation would take 
into account nongovernmental intergenerational redistribution. For example, a 
reduction in the stock market, like the crash of October 1987, will redistribute 
from older to younger  generations.  In terms of  the  fiscal balance  rule, the 
change in stock values spells a lower present value of consumption of  older 
generations and makes it easier to satisfy the fiscal balance rule. 
1.6  Conclusion 
Deficit delusion is far from a hypothetical possibility. As Feldstein  (1974) 
has shown, under the guise of “balanced budgets” the U.S. engaged in an enor- 
mous program  of  intergenerational redistribution through Social Security in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In 1983 the government dramatically reduced the future 
generosity of Social Security without the new legislation having any impact on 
the 1983  “deficit.” Other programs such as the 198  1 Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System and the 1986  Tax Reform Act have had important generational implica- 
tions that, again, were not reflected in the “deficit.” By ignoring or placing little 
emphasis on these and other intergenerational  policies and focusing on the 
“deficit,” we have generally come to believe that fiscal policy was tight in the 
1960s and 1970s and loose in the 1980s. In contrast, it appears that an analysis 
based on the fiscal balance rule would lead to the exact opposite conclusion. 
The concern with deficit delusion is heightened by the “social security sur- 
pluses” projected for the 1990s and beyond. These impending “surpluses” are 
already leading many commentators to suggest that fiscal policy will be tight 29  From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule 
in the 1990s.  In contrast, the fiscal balance rule perspective suggests there will 
be no particular tightening of  policy in the 1990s. In  focusing on the “sur- 
pluses” of the 1990s we could well end up with a much looser fiscal policy 
than will likely be justified by the fiscal balance rule. 
The use of  the fiscal balance rule or closely related rules will not be easy. 
Given the kinds of projections and assumptions  required for its implementation 
we may well end up with a quite rough measure of fiscal policy. Still, even a 
rough measure of actual fiscal policy would appear to be more accurate than 
the precise measure of  accounting whims that constitutes current description 
of  fiscal policy. 
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